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Articles
ONE LESSON FROM THE SIX MONSANTO
LECTURES ON TORT LAW REFORM AND
JURISPRUDENCE: RECOGNIZING THE
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE
J. CLARK KELSO"
The editors of the Valparaiso Law Review graciously invited me several
months ago to submit an article regarding some aspect of the five previous
Monsanto Lectures and the sixth lecture held in November of 1991, titled "Tort
Law Reform and Jurisprudence."' I have looked forward to the task with a
mixture of excitement and trepidation. Both reactions result from the same
circumstances, namely, the five Monsanto Lecturers are some of the most
distinguished tort scholars in the country,2 and the issue under discussion -
fundamental reform of the law of torts - is as complex as it is important. I
must put aside any self-doubts or misgivings, however, and plunge ahead into
the fray.3
The Monsanto Five agree that fort law should be reformed. Beyond this,
there is much disagreement about where the reforms will come from, if the
reforms ever will come, and what sort of reforms are called for. For example,
Priest4 believes that fundamental reform of the tort system is necessary and
inevitable (including reform of such institutions as the civil jury, the award of
pain and suffering damages, and the contingent fee system).5 Rabin doubts that
fundamental tort reform will occur absent some broad-based crisis in society
. Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. The transcript cited throughout this Article is on file with the Valparaiso University Law
Review [hereinafter Tr.]. A modified version of the Sixth Lecture is printed elsewhere in this issue
of the Review, at 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 701-64 (1992).
2. The Monsanto Five are, in the order in which they spoke at the 1991 Lecture: George Priest
(Yale), Robert Rabin (Stanford), Ernest Weinrib (University of Toronto), Peter Huber (Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research), and Richard Epstein (University of Chicago).
3. At the very least, I hope the views expressed in this Article will be "bad enough to be
wrong.- (Tr. 61, Huber, qoting Wolfgang Pauli, who was commenting upon a physics paper he
had been asked to review).
4. In the remainder of this Article, for the sake of convenience and brevity, I shall refer to the
lecturers by their last name only. See supra note 2.
5. Tr. 19, Priest.
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which will sweep in tort reform on its "coattails."6 Huber and Epstein hope for
changes in the way experts and expert testimony will be handled, though Epstein
is less sanguine than Huber about the prospects for change. 7
Part of the reason for these divergent views lies in the definition (or lack
of definition) for the term "tort." Does it refer only to the common law rules
as declared and implemented by the courts whatever those rules happen to be?
Or does it refer more specifically, as Weinrib contends, to the set of rules
which, by recognizing the "normative bond that singles out and connects the
particular parties to the litigation," creates a justification for requiring one party
to pay for the other's injury?' Or does it refer much more broadly, as Rabin
points out, to encompass other compensation and deterrence systems, such as
workers' compensation and administrative regulation?9
Although the Monsanto Five have their share of disagreements, at various
times in their articles and comments one can discern, somewhat obliquely, a
recurring common theme: courts and the judicial process have defining
characteristics which render them suitable to administer certain types of rules
or systems and unsuitable to administer other types of rules or systems.
Professor Priest, for example, argued that the fundamental principle of post-
1960s tort law expansions, the doctrine of enterprise or strict liability, as
implemented by our traditional judicial system," produced more harm than
6. Tr. 28, Rabin. See Robert L. Rabin, Torz Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of
Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 32 (1988).
7. Tr. 67-68, Huber; Tr. 87, Epstein. See Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sciosophy, 24 VAL.
U. L. REv. 319 (1990).
8. Tr. 54, Weinrib. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485,
490-91 (1989).
9. Tr. 24, 29, Rabin.
10. He expressed the idea as follows: "Now, as we all know, in the mid-1960s a change was
made.. . . The change was the introduction of a new idea. The idea that the goals of tort law
ought to be accident reduction in the provision of insurance; and to expand liability first through the
doctrine of strict liability, later through other changes in the regime, to expand liability on a broader
scale. That was the best way to achieve those basic goals." Tr. 14-15. Priest For Priest's
complete treatment of the historical development of enterprise liability and products liability, see
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14J. LEoiALSTUD. 461 (1985); George L. Priest, Strict Products
Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZo L. REV. 2301 (1989).
11. Characterized by Priest as follows: "[Now, these characteristics are familiar to all of us.
Vague standards of liability indeed in the early 1960s, these are - were very limited standards; but
that's one of the characteristics. A second is trial by jury, civil jury. Third, unconstrained
contingency fee armament for the full compensatory damages for loss and its worth regarded as the
unlimited pain and suffering damages. Again, implemented with nearly unbounding authority by
a lay jury." Tr. 12, Priest.
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good in society." Professor Rabin characterized our present system, with its
"open-textured liability rules, personalized damage judgments, and nonexpert
jury administration" as being "designed for dealing with the horse-and-buggy
era, two-party inter-personal conflicts that bear very little resemblance to the
context in which accidental harms occur today." 3 Professor Weinrib noted that
tort law, in contrast to a system of public compensation or insurance, relies
fundamentally upon the idea that in the context of a litigation between particular
parties, one can discover a "normative bond" connecting the parties which
would justify making one party pay for another's injury. 14  Peter Huber
focused his fire upon the use and misuse of expert witnesses and the demise of
the Frye rule," a demise which led to the introduction into evidence of
increasingly attenuated causation theories for the non-expertjury's consideration,
particularly in medical injury cases (such as cancer, fear of cancer, and
obstetrics litigation).' Professor Epstein agreed with Huber that the need to
rely upon expert witnesses creates problems for the tort system, and reiterated
his proposals for an increasing reliance upon external standards (such as industry
custom) in place of reliance upon a jury's "free-range discretion" to balance
costs against benefits in light of conflicting expert testimony. 17
Each of these arguments suggests that pushing the judicial system beyond
its natural competence and expertise has created part of our problem in the law
of torts. This is not a novel idea, of course. The Monsanto Five have written
persuasively about institutional constraints under which the common law system
labors and the need for developing rules of law that are well suited to the
12. Priest ultimately suggested that modern tort reform would succeed by altering the structure
of the judicial system, by "challeng[ing] basic measures of damages," by "challeng[ing] the
institution of the contingency fee," by 'challeng[ing] the institution of pain and suffering damages,"
and by 'challeng[ing] the appropriateness of the civil jury." Tr. 18, Priest.
13. Tr. 38, Rabin. Rabin concluded that fundamental reform of the tort system was not
politically possible in the near term and would have to await the sort of broad-based social and
political crisis that led to the creation of Workers' Compensation systems. "[I]t seems to me that
the lesson of history is that broad-based no-fault only comes on the coattails of more sweeping social
reform movements." Tr. 28, Rabin. For Rabin's discussion of the "horse-and-buggy" tort system's
difficulty in handling toxic and mass tort cases, see Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and
the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REv. 27 (1987).
14. Tr. 54, Weinrib. See also Ernest J. Weinrib, The Insurance Justfication and Private Law,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681, 683-85 (1985).
15. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
16. Tr. 63-70, Huber.
17. Tr. 75, Epstein. Epstein also proposed doing away with the practice of each side
compensating and coaching his own experts, and replacing that system with a system of court-
appointed experts (financed by the private litigants, but where the source of the funds is not
disclosed to the expert). Tr. 76-78, Epstein.
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abilities of the lay jury and non-expert judge.' One of the most complete
discussions of the issue appears in Donald Horowitz's excellent book, The
Courts and Social Policy, where he questions the courts' ability and competence
to structure remedies in the context of institutional civil rights litigation 9 I
suggest in this article that some of our difficulties in products liability cases stem
from a similar incompetence. In particular, the substantive rules of law that
courts have adopted to resolve these cases would appear to be beyond the
capacity of the judiciary which operates primarily as an adjudicative body
focused upon resolution of individual cases brought before that body on an ad
hoc basis.
I. DEALING wrrH HARM iN SOCIETY
A. The Broad Responsibilities of the Modern State
The limited role of courts and the equally limited function of tort law can
properly be understood only against the broad backdrop of public policy, defined
loosely here to include any and all aspects of life legitimately of concern to
public government.' Government has multiple responsibilities to the
People.2 It protects our national security, provides education, encourages
economic growth, and provides a safety-net for those whose economic status
warrants governmental intervention. These, along with many other
responsibilities, make up the daily grist for the political mill.
18. George L. Priest, Modem Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987) ('it
is my view that, although the founders of our modem tort regime embraced the goals of accident
reduction and compensation, the elaboration of modern law in recent years has lost sight of these
goals, and has ignored what can and what cannot be effectively accomplished through common law
rules"); Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 469, 477 (1987) (arguing
that trial courts and juries are ill equipped to handle the 'spate of balancing tests that are so common
today"); Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1717, 1718 (1982) ("[thc central theme of this Article is that the intellectual and institutional
constraints on common law adjudication require one to be very cautious in attributing major social
and economic consequences to common law rules"); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLutM. L. REv. 277 (1985) (arguing that
the judicial system is largely incapable of dealing properly with "public risks," such as risks
associated with mass produced products or drugs); Rabin, supra note 13.
19. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 17-19 (1977) (arguing that
courts do not have the competence to engage in social policymaking). See also Susan P. Sturm, A
Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. LJ. 1355 (1991).
20. For an excellent review of the many attempts to define 'public policy" in the law, see Kojo
Yelpaala, Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of Public Policy in Arbitration, Interstate and
International Conflict of Laws in California, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 379, 387-99 (1989).
21. I do not intend to suggest that government must, as a matter of theory, shoulder all of the
responsibilities mentioned in the text. Rather, I mean only that, as a practical matter, the federal
and state governments in the United States have actually assumed these responsibilities.
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Traditionally, one of the most important functions of government has been
to provide for public health, safety and morals. The goal of safeguarding public
health, safety and morals justifies an enormous variety of state regulations,
ranging from inoculation programs, to environmental protection, to criminal
laws. The importance of regulations directed at public health and safety and the
legislature's paramount role in safeguarding this interest is recognized by the
courts in, among other ways, the extremely deferential standard of review (i.e.,
"rational basis") used in assessing the constitutionality of such regulations.'
Providing for the public health, safety and morals naturally includes dealing
with the problem of "harm" in society. I will somewhat arbitrarily define
"harm" to mean any actual negative change in physical, economic or emotional
status.' As defined, "harm" includes quite a few things which courts and
legislatures generally do not recognize as being worthy of governmental
intervention (e.g., A breaks a lunch date with B). This of course does not mean
that the proposed definition of "harm" is too broad. To the contrary, when
defining "harm" it is better to err on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion
because a narrow definition might cause us improperly and arbitrarily to exclude
certain social realities from consideration. Moreover, a broad definition will not
create confusion or lead us into error so long as we recognize, as we do, that
not everything which constitutes a harm demands governmental intervention.
The question for government (including the courts) is, "What to do about
harm in society?" There are two aspects of the problem to be dealt with. First,
what to do when harm occurs? Second, how to prevent harm from occurring
(either by reducing the number of accidents or reducing the severity of the
consequences)? The first question directs our attention to treating and/or
compensating the injured person for their injuries. The second question directs
our attention to regulating and/or deterring conduct which creates risks of harm.
B. Compensating People for Harm Already Suffered
Considering compensation issues first, government must decide what harm
is compensable, who receives the compensation, how much the compensation
should be, and how to finance the compensation. At the broadest level, we can
imagine some sort of nationwide, universal health care and social insurance
22. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
23. This is roughly consistent with the definition of "harm" given in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) (1965) ("[Lthe word harm is used throughout the Restatement of this
Subject to denote the existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from
any cause"). Id. at 12.
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system.' A slightly narrower variation would be to replace the tort system
with a scheme of no-fault compensation for all injuries (which are to be
distinguished from diseases). As Rabin noted, such a system has been in place
in New Zealand for over a decade.' s These systems often are financed out of
tax revenues of one sort or another.?
Compensation in these no-fault schemes is generally less than what could
be awarded by a jury applying tort- damages principles. There are a variety of
limits which may be imposed, such as denying recovery for temporary income
loss, overruling the collateral source rule, setting a threshold of harm (e.g.,
serious disfigurement or impairment) before permitting recovery for pain and
suffering, and imposing arbitrary ceilings on the recovery of pain and
suffering." Although denying a plaintiff compensation for pain and suffering
or imposing ceilings on certain recoveries draws an arbitrary line between
compensable and uncompensable harm, a legislature can constitutionally draw
that arbitrary line, especially when the compensation system trades off quick and
more certain recoveries of smaller amounts for the more generous (but less
certain and less timely) awards permitted by the judicial system and common
law of torts.'
The judicial branch, unlike the legislative or executive branches, exhibits
a decided reluctance to draw arbitrary lines. Arbitrariness has traditionally been
viewed more as a vice than a virtue in judicial reasoning and decision-making.
Courts reason by analogy from prior cases and feel a responsibility to maintain
24. Tr. 29, Rabin. See also STEPHEN D. SUOARMAN, DOINO AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJIRY
LAW xv (1989) ("I favor doing away with personal injury law and replacing it with both new
compensation arrangements for accident victims and new mechanisms for controlling unreasonably
dangerous conduct. This book is an argument for that proposition.").
25. Tr. 30-31, Rabin. .Stephen Sugarman's book concisely reviews the many no-fault
compensation schemes which exist and have been proposed, including the New Zealand plan.
SUGARMAN, supra note 24, at 101-23.
26. As could be expected when dealing with taxes, there are a wide range of proposals for
financing no-fault systems, ranging from a broad-based, progressive national income tax to taxes or
fines imposed on a firm-by-firm basis (in an attempt to achieve some measure of deterrence).
SUOARMAN, supra note 24, at 110-13.
27. SUGARMAN, supra note 24, at 174-83.
28. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 85-86 (1978)
(upholding arbitrary limit on recovery of damages from future nuclear power plant accidents in part
because act would guarantee equal recovery to all claimants). There remains disagreement in the
state courts concerning the constitutionality of arbitrary caps placed upon tort recoveries (where there
is no trade-off between size of recovery and speed or ease of recovery). Compare Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (upholding constitutionality of $250,000 cap
on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases) with Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825
(N.H. 1980) (striking down cap on non-economic damages as violative of Due Process and Equal
Protection). See Frank B. Morrison & John M. Morrison, Constiturional Challenges to Tort
Reform: Equal Protection and State Constitutions, 64 DENV. U. L. REv. 719 (1988).
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some coherence in the precedents; legislatures draw whatever lines are
politically possible. 29 That is not to say that arbitrary lines are not in fact
drawn by courts. But the arbitrary lines which are drawn tend to be of the
"gatekeeper" variety.' The courthouse doors are simply closed to certain
plaintiffs.
The California Supreme Court's recent series of cases limiting the class of
plaintiffs who can recover for emotional distress absent physical injury are a
good example of how important public policy concerns sometimes trigger
judicially-crafted, arbitrary line-drawing.31  In Thing v. La Cuwsa,32 a
bystander case in which a mother suffered emotional distress upon seeing her
son lying in the street shortly after he had been struck by a car, the court
recognized that it had to draw some concrete, arbitrary limits upon recovery for
emotional distress "[i]n order to avoid limitless liability out of all proportion to
the degree of a defendant's negligence, and against which it is impossible to
insure without imposing unacceptable costs on those among whom the risk is
spread."" The court denied recovery in Thing because, applying its three-part
test, the plaintiff/mother was not actually "present at the scene of the injury
producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury
to the victim. "' The three-part test is arbitrary because it denies recovery to
some people (e.g., a cohabitant) whose emotional distress is equal to similarly
situated people who are permitted recovery (e.g., a legal spouse).3
Once a plaintiff has successfully navigated the judicial gatekeeper, courts
become much less likely to restrict a plaintiff's recovery by erecting artificial
barriers. That is why, for example, emotional distress damages (which include
pain and suffering) are generally awarded when the plaintiff has suffered some
physical injury even though the emotional distress, standing alone, may not be
29. EDWARD H. LEvi, AN INTRODUCION TO LEGAL REASONING 4-5, 22 (1949).
30. Richard Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1717,
1721 (1982).
31. The entire line of cases and associated secondary literature is carefully reviewed in Julie
A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1992).
32. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
33. Id. at 826.
34. Id. at 829. The other two requirements for recovery are that the plaintiff be "closely
related to the injury victim" and that the plaintiff "as a result [of witnessing the accident], suffers
serious emotional distress - a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested
witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances." Id.
35. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (denying recovery to cohabitant).
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so readily compensable. Once the physical injury establishes the plaintiff's
entitlement to be in court, an artificial limitation on the plaintiff's recovery of
full compensation (including pain and suffering) is anathema to the courts.3'
As for financing awards of compensatory damages, the path of least
resistance for a court in the context of a private dispute is to require a transfer
from defendant(s) to plaintiff in the full amount of the compensatory damages.
Courts may have power to compel public financing of private remedies in some
circumstances, but are understandably reluctant to exercise that quasi-taxing
power,' especially when the court has jurisdiction over a defendant with
money or insurance whose wrongful conduct caused the harm.
C. Preventing Harm in the Future
On the deterrence side of the equation, government must decide which
activities should be deterred, how those activities can best be deterred (e.g.,
whether by penalties, fines, imprisonment, or incentives), and what procedures
should be implemented to achieve the deterrence which is sought.
Reducing the number and severity of accidents and resulting harm is a
worthy social goal. It is not, however, a social goal that we pursue with
limitless vigor. In particular, if the cost of avoiding a particular type of accident
is too great when compared to the utility of the conduct which created the risk
of harm, the government may rationally determine that the conduct should not
be deterred. As a general matter, government should seek to deter conduct
(both defendant and plaintiff conduct) which creates a risk of harm only if the
social cost of reducing the risk is less than the social cost of the harm.39
36. The general rule in California and otherjurisdictions is that a person who suffers "physical
injury" is entitled to recover as parasitic damages the pain and suffering or emotional distress which
results from that physical injury. See generally 6 B. E. WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW,
Tors § 1409, at 879 (9th ed. 1988). The "physical injury" test has traditionally served as a
screening device to separate tort claimants into different categories for purposes of further analysis.
WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 362-65 (5th ed. 1984).
Those plaintiffs who suffer physical injury are permitted to recover consequential emotional harm
subject only to usual rules of proof. Id. at 363 ("[wlith a cause of action established by the physical
harm, 'parasitic' damages are awarded"). Those plaintiffs who suffer emotional harm but no
physical injury are ordinarily required to satisfy additional legal requirements in order to avoid
limitless liabilities and problems of judicial administration.
37. The judicial reluctance artificially to limit a plaintiff's recovery of damages once in the
courthouse was noted by Priest as a prime target for tort reform. Tr. 12, 18, Priest.
38. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (reversing district court's order
imposing local tax to finance desegregation plan as an abuse of discretion).
39. Calabresi expresses this same idea in stating that the overall function of accident law is to
"reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents." GUiDO CALABRESi,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970).
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Most governmental deterrence is achieved through the imposition of
statutory fines or penalties. There is in theory an economically most-efficient
size for these fines: the minimum amount of money which would cause the
person paying the fine to conform his conduct to the governmentally imposed
standard. Any amount less than this minimum would result in the safer conduct
not being followed; anything more would constitute an inefficient transfer of
wealth with no corresponding improvement in safety. The question in each case
should be, "how much will it take to teach this wrongdoer (and others like him)
a lesson?"
In the context of a lawsuit, courts apparently assume that requiring the
defendant to pay full compensatory damages is likely to achieve the right amount
of deterrence, or, more likely, that a compensatory award does not do a worse
job of setting the right amount for purposes of deterrence than a court would do
on its own. Posner and others have argued that compensatory damages are in
fact the exact right amount of money to require the defendant to pay and will
achieve the right amount of deterrence.' ° The courts do not seem to recognize
this principle, however, and the availability of punitive damages in appropriate
cases suggests that compensatory damages only roughly reflect the right amount
of deterrence."
D. The Role of the Law of Torts
With this broad background, we may now refocus our attention more
narrowly upon the law of torts. For purposes of this article, the law of torts can
conveniently be defined as that body of rules by which courts adjudicate and
resolve claims by one or more persons against other(s) for compensation arising
out of harm suffered by the claimant(s) (other than for breach of contract).
There is no great magic in this particular definition, and I make no claim that
this definition is the "right" definition, or that there even is a "right"
definition.'2 It is a definition which appears to reflect common understanding
and usage, and that is its only real claim to validity.
40. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 143 (2d ed., 1977) ("[a]s it happens,
the right amount of deterrence is produced by compelling negligent injurers to make good the
victim's losses. Were they forced to pay more . ..some economical accidents might also be
deterred; were they permitted to pay less than compensation, some uneconomical accidents would
not be deterred.").
41. It seems much more plausible that courts award compensatory damagesbecause (I) anything
les than full compensatory damages will leave the injured plaintiff undercompensated, and (2)
anything more than compensatory damages will constitute a windfall to that plaintiff. These reasons
have nothing to do with whether compensatory damages achieve the right amount of deterrence.
42. I THOMAS A. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY xxv-xxix (1909) ("[nlo
definition of tort at once logical and precise can be given.").
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As defined, the law of torts is only one small part of government's overall
response to the problem of harm in society. Thus, when we speak of tort law
reform and tort jurisprudence, we should keep in mind that we are not talking
about solving the entire problem of harm in society. The law of torts was never
intended to shoulder that burden, and it would, by virtually all accounts, be
hopelessly inadequate to the task if asked to shoulder that burden.' The
question for thought and analysis is not whether the law of torts can solve the
problem of harm in society, but, rather, how the law of torts may be changed
to do a better job of handling its own relatively narrow part of the government's
overall response to the problem of harm in society. Even more specifically,
since torts is the body of laws which courts use, the question is how courts can
change the law of torts to help courts do a better job of handling their part of
government's response to the problem of harm in society.
II. THE LIMrTs OF THE JUDIcIAL FuNCrION AND JUDICIAL COMPETENCE
Courts have as their principal function the resolution of disputes among
members of society in accord with present-day notions of law, justice, fairness
and public policy. There are many ways of resolving disputes, of course.
Divine intervention,' compurgation, 4 duels and torture were historically
permissible means of resolving disputes, and war is still a legal means of
resolving disputes among sovereigns.4' State sponsored terrorism and torture
still exists, but the practice is widely condemned as illegal under international
law. 47
Our modern judicial system rejects these forms of dispute resolution in
favor of an essentially Aristotelian model in which the ultimate conclusion is
"judgment for plaintiff" or "judgment for defendant."' In this model, rules
43. By some estimates, the tort system manages to direct almost two-thirds of the money taken
from wrongdoers to someone other than the injured person. J. S. KAKAUK Er AL., VARIATIONS
IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES xviii, 84 (1984). See also SUGARMAN,
supra note 24, at 1-72 ("The Failure of Tort Law").
44. The accused (e.g., an alleged witch, Tr. 57, Huber) was given the choice of killing herself
(e.g., by drowning in a lake) or saving herself (by coming out of the lake) only to be found guilty
and put to death for failing to trust in divine intervention to save her from drowning.
45. The accused could avoid punishment by giving an oath of innocence and procuring oaths
from eleven neighbors that they believed the accused's oath.
46. Compare U.N. Charter art. 51 (regarding self-defense) with art. 33 (regarding pacific
settlement of disputes).
47. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that state sponsored
torture violates customary norms of inteinational law).
48. Other forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation or negotiation, may draw upon other
paradigms of reasoning. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984). For purposes of this
Article, however, our focus is upon the court system where inductive and deductive reasoning
774
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of law (which are the formal expression of a particular society's concepts of
justice, fairness and public policy) function as the major premises in a series of
syllogisms leading to the ultimate conclusion. Facts (or characterizations of
facts) constitute the minor premises in the chain of reasoning. Judges - who are
experts in the law - determine what the major premises will be. The parties
must prove what the facts are by presenting evidence to the fact-finder (either
the judge or the jury), and the fact-finder must generally determine what the
facts are by relying only upon the evidence that has been presented. Except for
those facts of which the court may take judicial notice, our system generally
presumes that the fact-finder is not an expert with respect to any factual question
and thus must be "educated" by the introduction of relevant evidence.
In a system built upon principles of syllogistic reasoning, the content of the
major premise completely determines what the content of the minor premise
must be in order to reach the conclusion (and, of course, the major premise also
determines what the conclusion must be). Taking account of the respective roles
ofjudge and fact-finder, we may say that the particular rules of law constructed
by the judge determine what type of findings the fact-finder must make in order
to reach a conclusion. In other words, the substantive rule of law determines
what sort of information the fact-finder needs to complete the syllogism.
A well-crafted rule of law will take into account the ability of the fact-
finder properly to make whatever determination is required by the rule. As an
example of a poorly crafted rule of law, consider an instruction to a jury that
"the plaintiff should receive a favorable judgment if that result is in accord with
accepted notions ofjustice, fairness and public policy" (the "JFPP" rule). From
a purely formal perspective, this is a perfectly acceptable rule of law - it could
easily serve as the major premise in a syllogism or chain of syllogisms leading
to an ultimate conclusion. It is nevertheless a poorly crafted rule because it
vests in the jury the function of determining what is just, what is fair, and what
is the public policy, and we generally do not believe the jury is capable of
making those very general and, at times, delicate determinations (whereas the
court is generally viewed as being competent to make precisely those
determinations).
A better rule focuses the fact-finder's attention upon something more
precise and within the competence of the fact-finder. The jury may be
instructed, for example, to determine whether the defendant acted as a
reasonably prudent person in the circumstances (the "RPP" rule), and the court
may give the jury some broad hints about what the reasonably prudent person
would do (e.g., is aware of and follows relevant customs which may be proved
remain paramount.
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by plaintiff or defendant).
It is somewhat less obvious, but nevertheless true, that a well-crafted rule
of law should also take into account the rule drafter's own limited competence
correctly to determine what is just, what is fair, and what is consistent with
good public policy. The Supreme Court has recognized, for example, that its
judicial competence and role does not extend to the resolution of political
questions.49 The Court has also disclaimed a competence to determine what
federal expenditures serve the general welfare.5 State courts frequently
observe that the resolution of particularly important public policy issues is more
properly a task for the legislative branch.
5
'
It was noted above that the RPP rule is probably better crafted than the
JFPP rule because it takes account of the fact-finder's limited competence. An
even more specific rule than RPP, which would reduce the fact-finder's role to
that of determining the existence of only "underlying" or "operative" facts,
would be that "if the light were red when the defendant entered the intersection,
the defendant should be held responsible for the plaintiff's injuries."
Conceivably, courts could construct such detailed rules of law or "rules of
thumb" to deal with a wide range of recurring issues in personal injury
actions.52 The courts have generally eschewed these narrow rules of law,
however, in part because of a concern about impinging upon the jury's function
and in part because of a recognition that judges - the rule makers - lack the
practical competence to anticipate every circumstance in formulating rules of
law. Sometimes a general standard applied by the fact-finder is to be preferred
to a series of ad hoc judgments by the rule-maker. The dispute between Holmes
and Cardozo over the "stop, look, and listen" rule is a good example of the
tension between very specific rules of thumb and more general standards of
care. 
3
As a generality, judges and juries have certain characteristics and operate
under certain limitations that render them unsuitable for the resolution of certain
49. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (holding that evaluation of the
training of the Ohio National Guard inder the Fourteenth Amendment was a political question
because, in part, 'it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts
have less competence").
50. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 (Cal. 1988) (denying
existence of cause of action for wrongful termination in part because, given the complexities and
public policy consequences of creating such a cause of action, "the problem is one for the
Legislature").
52. Epstein, supra note 18, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. at 470.
53. Compare Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) with Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
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types of issues (either because the judge cannot formulate an appropriate rule or
because the jury is unable fairly to resolve disputes under whatever rule is
adopted). The characteristics and limitations are well known and need only be
touched upon here.'
First, judges, and especially appellate judges, are generalists. The system
as presently constituted - where the appellate courts are responsible for
overseeing the development and application of all aspects of the law within a
state and where assignments of cases to trial courts is random - could not
function any other way. It is, indeed, a source of pride to both trial lawyers and
trial judges that, notwithstanding their lack of expertise on any particular subject
(other than the process of adjudication), they are competent to try and decide
virtually any case on the docket.55
Second, although the judiciary's independence from the legislative and
executive branches and insulation from the electorate is a source of strength
when it comes to resolving individual cases,' those same characteristics make
the judiciary the least likely branch of government to represent the views of the
people. In a representative system such as ours, public policy is shaped in large
part by what the people demand. The distance between the people and the
judiciary suggests that judges should exercise great caution in attempting to
declare public policy absent direction from the other branches of government.
Third, courts generally do not set their own agendas. Cases are initiated
by others, and when a case is properly before a court, its constitutional
obligation is to proceed to judgment. Intermediate courts of appeal likewise
have no choice but to hear appeals when they are brought. The highest courts
in many states and the Supreme Court of the United States exercise more control
over their dockets and their agenda by granting or denying writs of certiorari.
But even here, the choice for these courts is only to hear or not to hear a case
brought before the judiciary by a third person. The courts have no power to
initiate their own processes.
54. See generally HORoWrrZ, supra note 19, at 22-67.
55. It might be more precise - but less flattering - to say that a trial lawyer and trial judge are
just as competent to try and decide any particular case on the docket as they are to try and decide
any other case on the docket.
56. Even where judges are elected, there is generally a tradition when running for a judgeship
of largely avoiding politics. A judiciary that violates this tradition is subject to professional and
public scorn. There are of course notable exceptions to the general proposition that members of the
judiciary are insulated from the voting public. One of the more dramatic examples in recent times
is the remaking of the Supreme Court of California in 1986 where people refused to reconfirm three
justices largely because of the public perception that these justices were an obstacle to enforcement
of the death penalty. See Anthony Paonita, Voters in Three States Reject Chief Justices, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 17, 1986, at 3.
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Fourth, juries are supposed to be the quintessential tabula rasa, people
chosen largely because of what they do not know about the subject matter of the
case. In practice, juries are not a blank slate, of course; they bring with
themselves a certain amount of common sense. Unfortunately, that common
sense may well be grounded in unfounded myths, biases, rumors or other
irrelevancies. As everyone knows, the deliberations of the jury are generally
kept inviolate. One reason for this rule is to protect the jury from outside
influences. Another reason - and perhaps a more important reason - is that the
deliberations of a jury are very likely to be infused with errors and
misunderstandings.' Our judicial system simply could not operate if jury
deliberations were subject to analysis and appellate attack.
Fifth, the judge and jury have no independent power to educate themselves
or to employ the services of an expert accountable only to the judge and jury.
Rather, they must depend upon the litigants to provide the necessary education.
The result is a battle of expert witnesses with the spoils going to the side whose
expert gives the most convincing story. The expert witness's credibility -
rather than the truth or falsity of the expert's conclusions - may be the most
critical factor. The battle of experts is most pernicious in those cases where
science has not yet caught up with litigation.
Sixth, because the adjudicative process is built upon a foundation of
Aristotelian logic, adjudication does not easily lend itself to other forms of
dispute resolution or problem solving. The balancing of interests that may be
achieved through negotiation and compromise (which lies at the very core of the
legislative process) is difficult to attain in a judicial proceeding when the
ultimate result must be either "plaintiff wins" or "plaintiff loses." Negotiation
and compromise are made even more difficult by the judiciary's reluctance to
draw the sort of arbitrary lines that often are the result of negotiation and
compromise.
These characteristics combine to produce an institution whose main
expertise is in resolving relatively simple, individual disputes between litigants
on the basis of pre-existing public policy as expressed in the common or positive
law. The judiciary gets close to (or crosses over) the edge of its competence
when the resolution of a dispute involves setting far-reaching public policies,
resolving complex technical or scientific disputes, or engaging in a balancing of
social interests with an eye to compromise.
57. A judge's deliberative process, if opened up for review, may be just as likely to contain
false starts and errors. The difference is that a judge must ordinarily explain his or her ruling
publicly and, often, in a written opinion. The process of producing that public explanation helps
focus a judge's attention away from irrelevancies and towards the real issues in the case.
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M. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: AN EXAMPLE OF How TORT LAW WAS
EXPANDED BEYOND THE JUDICIAL COMPETENCE
The ordinary slip-and-fall personal injury case or automobile accident is the
perfect sort of dispute for resolution by the judiciary. These cases arise out of
everyday activities and conduct well within the understanding and experience of
both judge and jury. The cases usually do not involve highly complex scientific
disputes.' The rules of law which govern resolution of such cases are well
established in both common law and statutes. Finally, because the number of
litigants is small, whatever decision is reached in the individual case will have
virtually no public policy implications.
The law of strict products liability and the ordinary strict products liability
case do not share these characteristics and do not present the perfect sort of
dispute for resolution by the judiciary. In the first place, moving from
negligence and/or warranty to strict liability in products cases (at least to the
extent that strict liability was intended to be something different from negligence
or warranty) involved the adoption by the judiciary of untested and largely
unstated public policies. Second, because the resolution of an individual case
could effectively doom entire product lines (as well as companies), the resolution
of many products cases depends upon a balancing of social interests far beyond
the narrow interests of the particular litigants before the court. Third, many
cases have involved complex scientific issues about which there is little
agreement even in the scientific community. Fourth, because the nominal focus
is upon the safety of the product (rather than upon the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct), the jury is not permitted to consider the one thing about
which it may be an expert: human conduct and the reasonableness of human
conduct. Instead, it must attempt to decide how safe the product is and should
be (which is a little like asking how high is up).
It is precisely because judges and juries lack the competence to administer
a strict liability system with respect to all products that strict products liability
appears to be on its death-bed, or at least quite ill.59 An empirical study by
58. This is not to say that accident reconstruction is not a complex subject. But the laws of
physics at the macroscopic level are well understood and agreed upon; there is no scientific dispute.
The dispute in accident reconstructions revolves not around the science, but around the factual
assumptions which are made in attempting to reconstruct the accident.
59. 'Strict products liability" is only one species of "products liability," and the failure of strict
products liability in no way reflects upon the strength of products liability as an independent field
in the law of torts. No one should doubt that special considerations come into play when a
consumer is injured in the normal use of a mass-produced product. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). The ultimate result of the strict products liability
movement may be nothing more than to shift the burden of proof in a negligence action from
plaintiff to defendant, an important, but still not earth shattering, development. See Robert L.
7791992]
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Professors Eisenberg and Henderson dramatically demonstrates that courts have
been retreating -- albeit somewhat quietly -- in products actions throughout the
1980s.1
From a purely theoretic standpoint, imposing strict liability upon
manufacturers for injuries resulting from their products has never received an
internally consistent and logically satisfactory justification. The four most often
cited reasons for strict products liability - the difficulty of proving negligence,
a public policy favoring the production of safer products, the protection of
consumer expectations, and a public policy favoring risk-spreading,6 are both
underinclusive (because they do not necessarily call for strict liability as opposed
to negligence or breach of warranty) and overinclusive (because they would
support absolute, rather than merely strict, liability).'
From a practical standpoint, the cases around the country are hopelessly in
conflict concerning even the most basic issues, and within many jurisdictions,
we have witnessed such rapid advances and retreats that both bar and bench act
at their peril.' Moreover, the court-made expansions have at least partly
Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi and Kievorick, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 633, 634-36 (1985).
60. James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990).
61. The original (or at least most often cited) statement of these reasons appears in Widliam
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 799-800
(1966). See also William C. Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tx. L.
REV. 777, 811-13 (1983); W. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 30, 34-35 (1973); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy ofInformation,
48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 399 (1970); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability - Some Observations About
Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966); John Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.i. 5 (1965). See also RICHARD EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILrrY
LAw 40 (1980).
62. J. Clark Kelso, Brown v. Abbott Laboratories and Strict Products Liability, 20 PAC. LJ.
1, 5-10 (1988).
63. Some might object that the law of products liability is relatively well settled in each
jurisdiction. It is, for example, a relatively trivial matter to restate the law of products liability in
California. That should come as no surprise, however, since after thirty years, most of the major
issues in products liability have been before the Supreme Court of California at least once.
The fact that the law in a jurisdiction can be easily stated at any particular moment in time is
not, however, the test of a well-functioning judicial system. The proper question - and the
minimum requirement - is whether the substantive law remains relatively stable over (at the very
least) relatively short periods of time (e.g., ten to fifteen years). This is where products liability has
failed. The Supreme Court of California, for example, has changed the law in products cases every
ten or fifteen years. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (adopting
strict products liability); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972) (rejecting
.unreasonably dangerous" requirement); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)
(defining "defective"); Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988)
(rejecting strict liability for prescription drug manufacturers); Anderson v. Owens-CoroingFiberglas,
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contributed to a perceived crisis and legislative response which undermines
public confidence in the judiciary and creates its own social problems.
There is nothing inherently difficult about the law of tortious responsibility
that makes such confusion necessary. For example, the reasonably prudent
person standard commands near universal adherence.' The elements of the
intentional torts have changed little over hundreds of years, and most
jurisdictions use the same vocabulary to describe the elements of these torts.
Defamation and misrepresentation have also remained relatively constant, with
the only seriously debated questions relating to constitutional concerns, in the
case of defamation, and limited duty concerns, in the case of misrepresentation.
Even more modem torts, such as interference with prospective business
advantage and invasion of privacy, have received a relatively consistent
treatment around the country, with only relatively minor variations and nuances
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Strict products liability has been another story altogether. Although there
appears to be some general agreement that there are three categories of defects-
manufacturing, design, and failure to warn - that is where the agreement ends.
Indeed, some jurisdictions do not even recognize three types of defect and treat
a failure to warn as simply one type of design defect, while other jurisdictions
treat failure to warn as a separate and distinct theory of recovery. Most
jurisdictions agree with the Restatement that a defect must be unreasonably
dangerous in order for strict liability to apply.' But some major jurisdictions,
such as California, have rejected the unreasonably dangerous requirement.'
The burden of proof in many jurisdictions is on the plaintiff,' but in other
jurisdictions it is put on the defendant.' Some jurisdictions impute knowledge
of the dangerous propensity of the article as of the time of manufacture and
distribution; others impute knowledge as of the time of trial.
810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991) (partially rejecting strict liability in failure to warn cases).
64. There remains only a residual of cases in which the standard is not used, those being the
cases where the objective standard of care is rejected in favor of a standard that takes account of the
limited ability of particular persons in particular circumstances to satisfy the objective standard of
care. See Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the
Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78
GEo. L. REv. 241 (1989).
65. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
66. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
67. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 523 N.E.2d 489, 493 (Ohio
1988).
68. Barkerv. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Feldmanv. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d
374 (NJ. 1984). See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi
and levorick, 14 J. LEOAL STUD. 633, 634-36 (1985).
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There is also no agreement as to the importance of state of the art. Some
jurisdictions treat it as an absolute defense; others treat it as a factor that a jury
is somehow supposed to weigh in the balance (although what weight should be
given to it is never made particularly clear); some jurisdictions ignore state of
the art altogether. In New Jersey, state of the art is apparently irrelevant in
asbestos cases but is a factor to consider in all other cases.'
There have been questions about whether failure to warn should be treated
as a strict liability concept or a negligence concept. Although the commentators
have almost uniformly argued that failure to warn should be treated more like
negligence than strict liability, some courts have held that failure to warn should
be treated in a strict liability fashion, and manufacturers can thus be held liable
for failure to warn about a danger that they were unaware of, had no reason to
be aware of, and even could not, by the exercise of all available scientific
judgment at the time, have been aware of'
In our common law system, with its more than fifty jurisdictions, we have
come to expect a certain amount of conflict between jurisdictions. The conflicts
we see in the area of strict products liability, however, are an order of
magnitude greater than what we ordinarily see. The conflicts relate to the most
fundamental questions, and the conflicts have created a crazy-quilt patchwork
in which manufacturers are held to widely divergent standards from state to
state. The state of the law is so pitiful that proposals at the federal level to
make the law of product liability uniform must be taken seriously despite the
fact that such reform would federalize what has traditionally been the province
of state law - personal injury.
What went wrong? Why does the law of strict products liability remain so
tangled after so much thought has been given to the subject by so many
thoughtful scholars, courts and commentators? The confusion cannot be from
a want of intelligence or attention. Why haven't the courts and commentators
settled upon something - anything? I propose that strict products liability has
not worked because holding a products manufacturer strictly liable for product
related harms involves precisely the sort of delicate balancing of public policies
and resolution of complex scientific disputes that judges and juries are largely
incompetent to undertake. In a phrase, strict products liability has failed
because courts are not competent to administer such a system in the context of
ad hoc, case-by-case adjudication.
69. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982) (state-of-the-art
irrelevant in asbestos case); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (state-of-the-art
relevant in failure to warn cases other than asbestos).
70. See generally Feldran, 479 A.2d 374.
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In the two sections which follow, I shall focus upon only two aspects of the
problem: (A) the original adoption of strict liability in the context of product-
related harms; and (B) the continuing debate over whether strict products
liability is or should be substantially different from negligence.
A. Strict Products Liability: Its Illegitimate Conception
The historical development of strict liability in the context of products was
vastly different from the development of traditional strict liability. Probably the
most obvious difference is that traditional strict liability had been applied to
particular, recurring fact patterns with which the courts had great experience,
and the courts were careful to make their judgments narrowly tailored to the
facts before them. Courts developed over the years special rules for dealing
with injuries caused by specific categories of animals." Ultrahazardous or
abnormally dangerous activities generated their own distinct line of equally
specific cases.' We are fairly certain, for example, that blasting operations
conducted in an urban or residential area are subject to a strict liability rule.'
We are also fairly certain that an uncontrolled blowout during drilling for an oil
well is subject to strict liability.'
These cases and rules reflected an understanding developed over time by
the courts that these particular activities could not be made safe by the exercise
of reasonable care and were substantially certain to cause harm.' Strict
liability worked in these cases largely because the courts were careful to keep
their holdings narrow. No fundamental public policies needed to be changed to
determine that blasting in town was ultrahazardous. No delicate balancing of
interests was involved in the determination that the owner of a leopard kept the
animal at his own risk.'6 Courts stayed well within the bounds of their own
competence.
Strict liability was applied to mass produced products at an entirely
different level of generality. Instead of applying strict liability to particular
products, such as explosives, the courts and commentators simply lumped all
products together under the strict liability tent and then carved out a few narrow
71. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 504-518 (1965) (Liability of Possessors and
Harborers of Animals) (1965).
72. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 519-524A (1965) (Abnormally Dangerous
Activities).
73. See, e.g., Colton v. Onderdonk, 10 P. 395 (Cal. 1886); Balding v. Stutsman, 54 Cal. Rptr.
717 (Ct. App. 1966).
74. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
75. The complete list of factors can be found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520
(1965).
76. Opelt v. AI G. Barnes Co., 183 P. 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919).
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exceptions for special interest groups (notably, drugs, tobacco, and alcohol).
Unfortunately, the implicit and explicit fact finding that preceded the adoption
of traditional strict liability (e.g., for explosives) did not occur in any systematic
way when it came to applying strict liability to all products. No one claimed
(because no one could plausibly claim) that all products were unsafe,
unreasonably dangerous, or posed substantial risks of harm to society. Yet the
adoption of strict liability for all product-related harms would seem to require
such a finding, at least under the approach followed in the traditional strict
liability cases.'7
Absent such a factual finding, a general shift away from negligence and
towards strict liability would appear to require the adoption by the judiciary of
a fundamentally different and new set of public policies than had previously been
applied to such cases. One would have expected to see the courts carefully
articulating those policies before applying strict liability to product-related
harms. One would have expected to see the courts considering the harm to
society which could be caused by applying strict liability to product-related
harms. One would have expected some caution.
In fact, courts did not become convinced that strict liability should be
applied to products on the basis of empirical fact-finding or by a careful
consideration of relevant public policies. Instead, the courts followed the path
laid out for them by a few well-respected commentators, particularly Dean
William Prosser. That path was forged not by reliance upon empirical data, but
by reliance upon rhetoric and reasoning, with an emphasis on the rhetoric. In
particular, Dean Prosser convinced the American Law Institute and the courts
that strict liability was already being applied by the courts through the use of
warranty principles and certain negligence principles (such as res ipsa loquitur),
and that since we already were doing strict liability under a different name, we
should simply recognize what already was happening in the courts by adopting
strict liability for products generally.' When the California Supreme Court
77. Prosser did not claim that all products were unsafe, and he recognized that strict liability
could not be applied to all product-related harms. The slightly narrower proposition that Prosser
offered to the American Law Institute was that defective products were unreasonably dangerous and
posed a substantial risk to society. Although this statement may appear to have substantive content,
in fact, there has never been an adequate definition of "defective" that does not make the statement
tautologically true. Reed Dickerson made this exact point when section 402A was being considered
by the American Law Institute, but his proposal to delete the word "defective" from the section was
defeated. 38 A.L.I. Proc. 87, 89 (1962). For an analysis of the drafting history of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 860-72 (1983); J. Clark Kelso,
Brown v. Abbott Labs. and Strict Products Liability, 20 PAc. L.J. 1, 13-15 (1988).
78. See William Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960).
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issued its decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. ,"9 which contained
as an alternative holding the adoption of strict products liability, Prosser had all
the authority he needed to ensure the adoption of Section 402A.
Strict products liability thus came into existence notwithstanding the absence
of either (1) a relevant factual finding that all products were unsafe or (2) a
careful consideration and explication of public policies which, if adopted, would
support the application of strict liability for all product-related harms. It was
conceived neither in the crucible of experience nor in the halls of representative
government. The result has been a doctrine grounded neither in factual reality
nor in firmly established public policies. Bereft of such moorings, it has drifted
to and fro for thirty years.
That the critical underpinnings for strict products liability were missing is
not very surprising. Judges have neither the experience nor the competence to
make the determination that all (or even most) products are unsafe. After all,
the courts never have all products before them; they have only one product at
a time before them. And even when all products cases are lumped together, the
courts have before them only a small portion of the total number of products
manufactured and sold in this country. Moreover, since the only products which
appear in court are products which some plaintiff thinks can be linked to an
injury, the court's experience with products and product-related harms is likely
to be biased in the direction of a finding that many products are dangerous.)
In these circumstances, courts are in a poor position to determine the overall
dangerousness of products. This sort of broad-based empirical question should
have been left to the legislative branch.
The necessary public policy declarations - which would relate to such
things as a policy favoring safer products, risk-spreading, and internalization of
costs - are likewise beyond the competence of the judiciary. Everyone can
agree that, in the abstract, we would like to have safer products, we would like
to see risks spread most efficiently throughout the economy, and we would like
to see an appropriate internalization of costs so that the price of goods reflects
the true cost of their production to society. The problem is not with the abstract
statement of these goals; the problem is that the pursuit of each of these goals
79. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
80. The non-representativeness of litigated cases (and especially appellate decisions) was
colorfully expressed by Karl Llewellyn when he argued that litigated cases bear the same relation
to reality 'as does homicidal mania or sleeping sickness, to our normal life." KARL LLEwELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BusH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 58 (1960). For a more recent debate on
whether litigated cases are representative, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 7he Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Donald Whittman, Is the Selection of Cases
for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection
Hypothesis: Learning from Whinman's Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985).
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may create conflicts with other equally important or more important social
objectives. For example, having safer products is a worthy goal, but everyone
agrees that there must come a stopping point somewhere. No product can be
made absolutely safe, and a good argument can be made that requiring
unreasonably extraordinary efforts to make products safe is counterproductive.
Likewise, risk-spreading and internalization of costs may be worthy ideals,
but they come at a significant cost to American industry and to the consumer.
The far - reaching consequences that may result from the pursuit of these goals
strongly suggests that their pursuit and adoption is a matter for legislative, rather
than judicial, action. As Priest points out, this is especially so in the context of
an international market where United States' companies must compete on price
(as well as quality). Burdening United States' companies with internalization of
costs when companies in the rest of the world are not required to shoulder that
burden undermines our international competitiveness. Courts are in an
exceptionally poor position to balance incremental safety to the consumer against
the health of our international competitiveness.
When all is said and done, the adoption by the courts of strict liability for
product-related harms was an abuse of judicial power. As will be seen in the
next section, the original abuse has haunted the courts for thirty years as they
have struggled to make sense out of their creation.
B. What, If Anything, Makes Strict Products Liability So Strict?
Although courts generally believed they were supposed to be utilizing
principles of strict liability to resolve cases involving product-related harms
(because that is what Section 402A and Prosser said), in the absence of the
necessary fact-findings or declaration of public policies in support of that
position, we have seen in the development of strict products liability an on-
again/off-again commitment to strict liability. From the very beginning, the
problem has been to give substantive content to the idea that manufacturers
would be held strictly liable for physical injuries which their products have
caused.
Section 402A did not resolve this most fundamental problem. There was
liability under 402A only if the product was "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.""' The inclusion of the
phrase "unreasonably dangerous" made Section 402A sound a lot like
negligence. Was 402A saying nothing more than that a manufacturer would be
held strictly liable if it had been negligent? Surely not, but what then to make
81. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
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of the black-letter?
The comments to 402A only made matters worse. "Defective condition"
was defined in comment g to mean that the product was "in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous
to him."' Comment i then defines "unreasonably dangerous" to mean
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer."' The definitions are hopelessly circular, and as defined,
"defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" apparently meant the same
thing."
The Supreme Court of California recognized that section 402A as drafted
did not clearly provide for strict liability. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. ,'
the court considered whether the jury instruction in a products liability action
should include the requirement that the product be "unreasonably dangerous."
In explaining 402A, Prosser contended that the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement was intended only to prevent products liability from becoming
absolute liability; it was not intended to makes products liability negligence-
based."
The Supreme Court of California would have none of this, however. It
complained that "[t]he result of the limitation . . . has not been merely to
prevent the seller from becoming an insurer of his products with respect to all
harm generated by their use. Rather, it has burdened the injured plaintiff with
proof of an element which rings of negligence. "I In order to distinguish strict
products liability from negligence, the court held that plaintiffs in California
would henceforth be relieved of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement; it
would be sufficient to prove that the product was defective.8
Deep-sixing the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" from the black-letter did
not solve the problem, however, because the phrase "defective condition" still
needed to be defined (and, as noted above, comment g to 402A included the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement in its definition of "defective
condition"). Scholars tried to fill the gap by providing definitions of "defective"
that would distinguish strict products liability from negligence. The proposed
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
84. Reed Dickerson was right. See supra note 77.
85. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
86. William Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS LJ. 9, 23
(1966).
87. Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1161-62.
88. Id. at 1163.
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definitions were, at first glance, little more than a rehash of the same risk /
utility test used in negligence actions. Wade proposed seven factors which the
trier of fact could consider." Keeton proposed more simply that "[a] product
is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed,"' a test which
explicitly incorporates a risk / utility analysis. Notwithstanding Cronin and the
similarity between the proposed definitions and negligence, the Supreme Court
of California embraced the risk / utility test in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.9
The problem after Barker was that strict products liability did not look very
much like strict liability; it looked like negligence. Keeton, among others,
proposed that the products risk / utility test be distinguished from negligence by
focusing in the products case upon the state of knowledge at the time of trial
rather than at the time of sale of the product (which would be the appropriate
time under a negligence analysis).' A corollary of Keeton's approach is that
state-of-the-art evidence would be irrelevant and inadmissible. This really was
strict liability, and Keeton is to be commended for at least taking seriously the
notion that strict products liability was supposed to be strict liability.
89. These factors include:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole. (2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. (3) The availability of a
substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe. (4) The
manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing
its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility. (5) The user's ability
to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product. (6) The user's
anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability,
because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions. (7) The feasibility, on the part of the
manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying
liability insurance.
John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
90. W. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-
38 (1973)
91. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). The court in Barker recognized that the definition of 'defective"
made relevant the same considerations "typically presented in a negligent decision case," and to
make strict products liability different from negligence, the court held that "once the plaintiff makes
a prima facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden
should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the product
is not defective." Barker, 573 P.2d at 455. Under this approach, a design defect case in California
is really nothing more than a negligence case where the defendant has the burden of proof.
92. Keeton, supra note 90, at 38 (a product "is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person
would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at
the time of trial outweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed")
(emphasis in original); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX.
L. REv. 398, 407-08 (1970). See generally John Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 761-64 (1983) (reviewing
Keeton's position).
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Some courts followed Keeton's advice to the letter. Thus, we have the now
infamous decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,93 where the
court rejected state-of-the-art as a permissible defense in a failure to warn /
asbestos case." The Beshada court did nothing more than live up to the strict
liability label, but its decision triggered a storm of protest,"5 and the New
Jersey Supreme Court beat a hasty retreat in Feldman v. Lederle Labs.,96
where it limited Beshada to its facts and returned to a negligence standard in
failure to warn cases.' When scholars and the court came face-to-face with
strict liability for product related harms - true strict liability - they did not like
what they saw.
In two relatively recent decisions, the California Supreme Court has
struggled with the even more fundamental question of whether strict liability
should apply at all to certain products and certain types of defects. In Brown
v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.),' the court considered whether strict liability
should apply in a design defect / failure to warn case involving the prescription
drug DES. In rejecting strict liability in favor of negligence, the court (per
Justice Stanley Mosk) explained that the social importance attached to the
development and marketing of drugs outweighed the risk of harm inherent in the
product. Specifically, the court held that "the broader public interest in the
availability of drugs at an affordable price must be considered in deciding the
appropriate standard of liability for injuries resulting from their use."' In
other words, when the court finally faced the consequence of imposing strict
liability upon the drug industry, it realized that strict liability would cause more
harm than good.
Mosk was well aware when he drafted the Brown opinion that its analysis
93. 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982).
94. The court relied extensively in its analysis upon Keeton's 1970 article in the Texas Law
Review, Keeton, supra note 92.
95. See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Genetic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment K and for
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REa. 853, 877-82 (1983); Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty
to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 892,
901-05 (1983); John Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 754-56 (1983); William R. Murray, Jr. Comment, Requiring
Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71 GEO. LJ.
1635 (1983); Robert D. Casale Comment, Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp.: Adding
Uncertainty to Injury, 35 RutroEts L. REv. 982, 1008-15 (1983); Robert D. Towey, Note, Products
Liability - Strict Liability in Tort - State-of-the-Art Defense Inapplicable in Design Defect Cases,
13 SEroN HALL L. REV. 625 (1983).
96. 479 A.2d 374 (NJ. 1984).
97. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 388. Just as the California Supreme Court did in Barker, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Feldman put the burden of proof on the defendant. Id.
98. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
99. Id. at 478-79.
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could rather easily be applied across the board to all products. After all, is
there not an important public interest in the availability of most products at an
affordable price? Attempting to head off this line of argument, Mosk proposed
in Brown two reasons for limiting the case to drugs: (a) prescription drugs
"may be necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or to sustain life," and (b)
"harm to some users from prescription drugs is unavoidable.""° Mosk hoped
that reason (a) would distinguish prescription drugs from products such as
construction machinery, lawnmowers, and perfumes, products which only are
"used to make work easier or to provide pleasure."' Mosk hoped that
reason (b) would distinguish prescription drugs from other life saving or pain
avoiding devices, such as wheelchairs." 2
I have previously argued that Mosk's attempt to limit Brown's holding to
prescription drugs was likely to fail."ro In short, many products other than
drugs are just as important to society, and harm to users from all products is
unavoidable to a certain extent. At the very least, because the court's social
fact-finding powers are so limited, the court has little empirical basis for
distinguishing products on this basis. Moreover, Mosk in Brown focused
primarily upon the direct benefits and risks of prescription drugs (i.e., they often
save lives but sometimes harm the patient), a focus that ignores other important
indirect consequences which result from applying strict liability (such as
impairing the competitiveness of American industry, a matter of important public
concern).
In Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas," the court extended Brown's
reasoning to a failure to warn/asbestos case, over Mosk's lone dissent."' The
majority explained that, although Brown's "holding applies only to prescription
drugs, . . . [its] logic and common sense are not limited to drugs.""s This
recognition holds out the promise that the court will begin to consider more
completely the consequences and public policy implications of holding
manufacturers strictly liable for product related harms, or, at least, will begin
to realize that it lacks the competence to make the far-reaching determinations
necessary to support strict products liability. Significantly, footnote fourteen of
the court's opinion appears to deliver a death-blow to the risk-spreading
rationale of strict products liability, one of the critical underpinnings of
100. Id. at 478.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. J. Clark Kelso, Brown v. Abbott Laboratories and Strict Products Liability, 20 PAC. LJ.
1, 25-28 (1988).
104. 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
105. Id. at 561 (Mask, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 556.
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enterprise liability." 7
Yet the Anderson court did not follow Brown entirely. Unable to accept the
full consequences of Brown's logic, the majority attempted to limit its holding
to the failure to warn context (leaving design defect cases untouched).
According to the majority, "[t]he 'warning defect' relates to a failure extraneous
to the product itself. Thus, while a manufacturing or design defect can be
evaluated without reference to the conduct of the manufacturer... the giving
of a warning cannot. The latter necessarily requires the communicating of
something to someone. How can one warn of something that is
unknowable?""
This reasoning is unconvincing. Warnings may be practically and
conceptually separable from the product, but the warnings and packaging which
accompany the product remain part of the product, and Beshada shows that it
is a simple matter to consider the adequacy of a warning without considering the
manufacturer's conduct. Moreover, the court's rhetorical question - "how can
one warn of something that is unknowable" - can just as easily be asked in
design defect cases: "How can one design a product to be safer with respect to
unknowable risks?"
The court was apparently not convinced of its own argument, because it
then explained that "despite its roots in negligence, failure to warn in strict
liability differs markedly from failure to warn in the negligence context."' °9
In particular, "the fact that a manufacturer acted as a reasonably prudent
manufacturer in deciding not to warn, while perhaps absolving the manufacturer
of liability under the negligence theory, will not preclude liability under strict
liability principles if the trier of fact concludes that, based on the information
scientifically available to the manufacturer, the manufacturer's failure to warn
rendered the product unsafe to its users." "
This attempt to distinguish strict liability failure to warn from negligence
failure to warn is reminiscent of the California Supreme Court's decisions in
Cronin and Barker, where the court abandoned "unreasonably dangerous" in
favor of an undefined term, "defective," and then was forced to define
107. The footnote reads in part as follows: 'The suggestion that losses arising from
unknowable risks and hazards should be spread among all users to the product, as are losses from
predictable injuries or negligent conduct, is generally regarded as not feasible. Not the least of the
problems is insurability." Id. at 559 n.14.
108. Id. at 558.
109. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 810 P.2d 549, 558 (Cal. 1991).
110. Id. at 559.
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"defective" in a way that reintroduced the concept of "unreasonable
danger.""' Like the Cronin court, the Anderson court was unwilling simply
to adopt negligence as the standard for failure to warn (which is what comment
i to 402A rather clearly does), and substituted in its place a vague and very
likely unworkable standard: whether the failure to warn of a scientifically
knowable risk renders the product unsafe to its users.
Just as Cronin left us wondering what it means to be "defective," Anderson
leaves us wondering what it means to be "scientifically knowable?" Must the
specific risk actually be known at the time of sale, or is it enough that, given the
state of scientific knowledge, someone might have discovered the risk? If the
latter is the test, how will a jury determine what was "scientifically knowable?"
Will courts permit so-called experts to testify as to what scientists might have
discovered twenty years ago? And what does it mean to be "unsafe?" Is an
"unsafe" product the same as a "defective" product (which is the same as an
"unreasonably dangerous" product)? Or does the mere fact that the product
caused harm mean that it is "unsafe?"
It is unfortunate that the court did not follow Brown's lead and declare that
failure to warn cases would henceforth be decided under negligence principles.
This would have clarified the law and set the groundwork for the next logical
step: the extension of Brown to all design defect cases and a return to
negligence/warranty. Anderson shows that the court still has one foot firmly
planted on the wrong side of the fence. The court still considers itself and the
jury competent to administer a strict products liability system notwithstanding
the absence of either factual support or clearly articulated and agreed upon
public policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Judicial Branch must guard against demanding too much from judges,
juries and the judicial process. "Courts of Justice do not pretend to furnish
cures for all the miseries of human life."" 2 Nor should they. Courts must
especially guard against the temptation to use the adjudicatory process - with
its focus upon the individual plaintiff and individual defendant - as a tool to
achieve substantial social change. The adjudicatory process is a blunt tool for
implementing such changes, and in a representative democracy, social change
should, at least in the first instance, be the prerogative of the Legislative
Branch.
111. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
112. Evans v. Evans, Consistory Court of London (1790).
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When the courts embarked upon the strict products liability adventure some
thirty years ago, they threw caution to the wind. Untested and debatable public
policies (such as risk spreading) were given play by the courts, and judges and
juries arrogated to themselves the power to make in individual cases decisions
implicating far-reaching public policies. The recent trend of the cases is
decidedly away from strict liability and towards negligence. What is needed
now is for some courageous jurisdiction to take the next step and declare that the
strict products liability experiment has been a failure and is at an end.
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